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I.    INTRODUCTION 
“As any basic text teaches, any thing or event can be used as a basis of 
taxation. . . .  Despite the potential for long-term effects, to date the 
controversies over taxes and the Internet have exponentially produced more 
heat than light.”1  If consumer purchases are going to be subject to tax, all 
purchases should be taxed.2  The sales tax has many exclusions, one of the 
most important being sales made by remote sellers that are subject to a de 
facto exemption.3  However, these sales may also be subject to a use tax, 
which is a form of sales tax on purchases made outside the purchaser’s home 
state for taxable items the purchaser will store, use, or consume in their 
home state on which no tax was collected in the state purchased.4 
Use taxes are better understood to be companions of sale taxes because 
credits are given for the sales tax paid to avoid double taxation.5  Put simply, 
 
1. William V. Vetter, Preying on the Web: Tax Collection in the Virtual World, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
649, 651 (2001) (reviewing debates on taxes and Internet transactions).  William V. Vetter is an assistant 
professor at Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne.  He earned his J.D. from University of 
Oregon and an L.L.M in Taxation from George Washington University, D.C. 
2. See John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the Twenty-
First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 345 (2003) (describing the nuances of sales and use tax from a policy 
perspective). 
3. See id. at 353 (identifying statewide patterns in U.S. sales taxes). 
4. In Texas, the rates for sales and use taxes are both 6.25% of the sales price.  TEX. TAX CODE 
ANN. §§ 151.051, 151.101.  The Texas Tax Code also contains provisions defining when a retailer 
conducts business in Texas.  TAX § 151.107. 
5. See Vetter, supra note 1, at 663 (describing use tax as a protective measure from double 
taxation). 
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if you do not pay a state sales tax, you owe your domicile state a use tax.  If 
you do pay a state sales tax, you still technically owe your home state a use 
tax, but you are credited by the amount you paid.6  In many states, the use 
tax rate is the same as the sales tax rate.7  The most notable difference is 
that sales taxes are collected by sellers who act as an agent of the state, 
whereas use taxes are self-assessed and reported by consumers—if they are 
reported at all.8 
Consider the position of a seller with an obligation to collect sales tax on 
every transaction.  Should every seller be subjected to this requirement?  Or 
should the application of this requirement be limited and allow for 
exceptions?  How should states approach widespread variations in tax rates?  
The taxing jurisdiction has a significant impact because the tax rates vary 
within states, cities, and counties.  For example, a business may want to be 
subject to the sales tax in Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, or 
Oregon, where the base sales tax rate is a whopping 0%.9  Businesses will 
likely avoid tax jurisdiction in Louisiana because it is the state with the 
highest combined rate and second highest average local rate, with a 
combined local and state tax rate of up to 10%.10 
These are only some of the questions we face in light of South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, Inc.,11 and the taxation without representation debate.12  The 
purpose of this Comment is to explore the answers to these questions.  
Ultimately, this Comment concludes the Supreme Court correctly revisited 
the issue of nexus requirements for e-commerce taxation collection; 
 
6. See id. (conceptualizing credit for sales tax paid in another jurisdiction). 
7. See id. (“With respect to every significant factor, except taxable event, sales taxes and use taxes 
are identical.”). 
8. For additional background information into sales and use taxes, see generally Emily L. Patch, 
Note, Online Retailers Battle with Sales Tax: A Physical Rule Living in a Digital World, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 673 (2013) (providing a historical account of the evolution of e-commerce). 
9. State Rates, AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com/taxrates/en/staterates.html?referrer=https 
%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&lastReferrer=www.avalara.com&sessionId=1545578349394 
[http://perma.cc/VR6Z-34KX]. 
10. See Michael B. Sauter, States with the Highest and Lowest Sales Taxes, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/taxes/2018/03/27/states-highest-and-lowest-sales-
taxes/452512002/ [http://perma.cc/UX52-25NQ] (providing the sales tax and combined sales tax of 
multiple states); State Rates, supra note 9. 
11. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
12. See id. at 2099 (holding states may impose sales taxes on out-of-state transactions regardless 
of physical presence in the taxing state). 
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however, this Comment aims to fill in the gaps the Court incorrectly decided 
were better left to Congress. 
This Comment will begin with an overview of online sales tax to create a 
foundation for the discussion in Part II.  The overview will describe the 
purpose and need for a reform of the sales tax nexus standards.  It will also 
provide a historical background as well as an analysis of case law to show 
how the Supreme Court has shaped their view over time.  Part III will 
discuss who decided the issues correctly and why based upon the decision’s 
impact, burden, and government intervention.  Part IV analyzes current 
responses and criticism, and proposes a resolution. 
II.    AN OVERVIEW OF ONLINE SALES TAX 
A. Purpose and Need for Reform 
Electronic commercial transactions, or e-commerce, has developed 
exponentially over the last fifty years.13  By 2011, business to consumer e-
commerce “totaled $4.1 trillion [in sales] and had grown at an annual 
compounded rate of 13.0 percent since 2000.”14  This development has 
created implications for state governments because “[s]ellers only collect 
sales tax” when the seller has a nexus in the consumer’s home state.15  The 
result is essentially a tax evasion—the consumers that are not charged sales 
tax usually do not pay the use tax their home state imposes.16  This tax 
evasion reduces the price, which electronic retailers, or e-tailers, appear to 
take advantage of by avoiding the creation of nexus and, ultimately, tax 
responsibility.17 
Consequently, states have experienced a steady decline in tax collections 
as e-commerce continues to grow.18  In 2012, a University of Tennessee 
study approximated that states lost almost $23 billion from their inability to 
 
13. Taxation issues arising from nontraditional retailers, those that conduct sales without a 
brick-and-mortar store, date back to 1967.  See Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 
757–59 (1967) (holding mail-order sellers were not required to collect sales tax unless it had some form 
of physical presence in the state). 
14. Donald Bruce et al., E-Tailer Sales Tax Nexus and State Tax Policies, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 735, 736 
(2015). 
15. See id. (examining how state tax policy affects the establishment of nexus in each state). 
16. See id. (explaining consumers not charged a sales tax will not pay, resulting in a form of tax 
evasion). 
17. See id. (“[E]-tailers appear to arrange their affairs to avoid establishing nexus . . . .”). 
18. See id. (“Annual e-commerce sales tax revenue losses are estimated to be $11.4 billion . . . for 
2012 . . . and will likely continue to grow rapidly . . . .”). 
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collect taxes on online purchases from different states.19  In 2018, both the 
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and the International 
Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) updated these numbers, and estimated 
uncollected taxes increased to almost $26 billion per year, of which more 
than $17 billion were from e-commerce.20  Unsurprisingly, states have tried 
to tap into this revenue for years.21  States will likely remain unsuccessful; 
since many Internet businesses are solely online, incorporated in one state, 
and sell products across all states, the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution regulates e-commerce transactions.22 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution sets forth 
the right of equal protection, stating that no state shall “deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”23  The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as meaning “that citizens 
cannot be unfairly taxed and thus deprived of their tax dollars.”24  Thus, 
states may not tax sellers unless minimum contacts or a nexus has been 
satisfied.25  An inquiry into due process focuses on whether the out-of-state 
taxpayer’s connections with the forum state are sufficient to give notice that 
it may be taxed by the state.26  The Commerce Clause, which is more 
restrictive than the Due Process Clause, expressly provides Congress with 
the power “to regulate commerce . . . among the states.”27  Though 
Congress may not authorize states the right to tax without satisfying the 
 
19. See Max Behlke & Jake Lestock, Remote Sales Tax Collection, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS.  
(June 6, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/e-fairness-legislation-overview.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/RYH4-6CMS] (describing the massive losses states endure due to consumer sales 
tax evasion). 
20. See id. 
21. See Christina T. Le, The Honeymoon’s Over: States Crack Down on the Virtual World’s Tax-Free 
Love Affair with E-Commerce, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 395, 401 (2007). 
22. See id. (explaining how the regulation of Internet business falls within the powers of the 
Commerce Clause). 
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
24. Le, supra note 21, at 401. 
25. Id. 
26. See Sidney S. Silhan, Comment, If It Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix It: An Argument for The Codification 
of the Quill Standard for Taxing Internet Commerce, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 671, 679 (2007) (“The Due 
Process analysis centers on whether a taxpayer’s connections with the jurisdiction are sufficient to give 
notice that it may be haled into court, or subject to a tax, in that jurisdiction.”). 
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (setting forth congressional powers to regulate commerce);  
see Silhan, supra note 26, at 680–81 (reiterating the power Congress possesses through the Commerce 
Clause). 
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requirements of the Due Process Clause,28 the Commerce Clause allows 
Congress to legislate the level of physical presence required to establish a 
substantial nexus with the forum state.29 
Nevertheless, because Congress has not done so, the Supreme Court has 
stepped in to make a decision on the constitutionality.30  The Supreme 
Court has debated its scope of power in restricting state regulation under 
the dormant Commerce Clause for decades.31  Though the Supreme Court 
has restricted their role over time, it has continued to exercise considerable 
power over state taxes.32 
B. Historical Background 
Since 1967, people have tried defining when a substantial nexus between 
states and taxpayers exists.33  The debate has continued for over fifty 
years.34  The conflict boils down to who and what creates physical 
presence.35  Before Wayfair, the Supreme Court last addressed this issue of 
tax nexus in 1992.36  In the meantime, the Court left the issue to be 
determined by state judiciaries that have “resolved” the same questions with 
conflicting solutions—only adding to the ambiguity and unpredictability 
 
 28. Silhan, supra note 26, at 680. 
29. Id. (“The dormant Commerce Clause allows Congress to prevent the states from imposing 
taxes that are restrictive of interstate commerce.  It also allows Congress to require minimum standards, 
such as physical presence in the state, before taxation can occur.”). 
30. See id. at 681 (stating the Supreme Court created a four-part test). 
31. See Adam B. Thimmesch, A Unifying Approach to Nexus Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 101 (2018). 
32. See id. (“Specifically, the Court has continued to restrict states’ power to compel out-of-state 
vendors to collect their sales and use taxes based on a physical-presence ‘nexus’ rule.”). 
33. See Jonathan E. Maddison, Why Wayfair Won’t Matter, TAX EXEC. (May 31, 2018), 
http://taxexecutive.org/why-wayfair-wont-matter/ [http://perma.cc/SR8X-H7TC] (explaining the 
difficulty in determining when a nexus exists). 
34. Id. 
35. See id. (“For over fifty years, states and businesses have struggled to understand when a 
‘substantial nexus’ exists between a state and a taxpayer, leading to the unavoidable debate over two 
words: physical presence.”). 
36. Id.  The last time the Supreme Court addressed the issue of tax nexus was in the 1992 case 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.  See generally Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (creating the 
physical presence test). 
6
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2019], No. 3, Art. 5
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss3/5
  
2020] COMMENT 743 
 
that encompasses substantial nexus.37  As technology continues to develop 
and influence our nation’s economy, the debate has intensified.38 
In Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue,39 the Supreme Court decided 
retailers were not required to collect taxes where the seller did not have a 
physical presence in the consumer’s state.40  In 1992, this decision was 
reaffirmed in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,41 which regulated the collection of 
online sales tax for almost twenty-five years.42  However, as Kennedy wrote, 
it is important to note that when Quill was decided, fewer than 2% of people 
in the United States had access to the Internet,43 whereas today that number 
has increased to almost 89%.44  Kennedy also stated that in 1992, “the 
Court could not have envisioned a world in which the world’s largest retailer 
would be a remote seller.”45 
Consequently, in 2018 the Supreme Court revisited the issue in South 
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., in which the Court was left to choose between 
affirming or rejecting the physical presence rule.46  The controversy led to 
a 5–4 split in the decision.47  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts 
wrote: 
 
37. See Maddison, supra note 33 (highlighting how contradicting answers have resulted in further 
ambiguity). 
38. See, e.g., id. (“To many, Wayfair is good reason to hope for clarity in a landscape riddled with 
uncertainty.  That hope is bolstered by the prospect of the Court clarifying not only questions dating 
to 1967 but also questions stemming from the growth of the internet and online shopping.”). 
39. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
40. See id. at 758 (recognizing retailers do not have to collect taxes when they have no physical 
presence in a particular state); see also Maddison, supra note 33  (“[A] state cannot require an out-of-
state seller to collect and remit use tax for sales to in-state purchasers.”). 
41. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992) (reaffirming states cannot force an 
out-of-state retailer to collect taxes). 
42. See Maddison, supra note 33. 
43. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018) (noting the drastic change 
in Internet usage since the Quill decision). 
44. Id.; see Maddison, supra note 33 (“These issues were (and continue to be) exacerbated by the 
evolution of technology and its impact on the national economy.”). 
45. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 2097 (citing Shan Li, Amazon Overtakes Wal–Mart as Biggest Retailer, 
L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-amazon-walmart-20150724-
story.html [https://perma.cc/6YFL-ZCCM]; see Maddison, supra note 33 (reaffirming the Supreme 
Court did not foresee how popular online shopping would become). 
46. See Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 2097 (revisiting the physical presence rule); see also Maddison, 
supra note 33 (representing the culmination of the physical presence debate). 
47. See id. at 2087 (revealing there was not a unanimous opinion). 
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This is neither the first, nor the second, but the third time this Court has been 
asked whether a State may obligate sellers with no physical presence within its 
borders to collect tax on sales to residents.  Whatever salience the adage “third 
time’s a charm” has in daily life, it is a poor guide to Supreme Court 
decisionmaking.48 
In order to better understand the impact of the decision and whether it is 
the best decision for approaching the nexus of remote sellers in e-
commerce, a closer look at the precedential cases is required. 
C. Analysis: Changes in Law, Distinctions, Where Are We Now 
1. Discussion of Bellas Hess 
National Bellas Hess (National) was a popular merchandise catalog and 
mail-order house in the 1900s.49  Customers mailed their orders to 
National’s Missouri plant, and National either mailed the goods to 
customers or delivered the goods through a common carrier.50  National 
did not have an office, distributor, warehouse, business, or representative in 
Illinois.51  In this case, the Supreme Court held that a company must have 
a nexus with a state to be responsible for tax liability.52  Further, the 
Commerce Clause prohibits a state from imposing use tax on a seller whose 
only connection in the state is common carrier or mail.53  Justice Stewart 
wrote that imposing this kind of burden on the state could create 
“unjustifiable local entanglements” that “Congress alone has the power [to 
regulate] and control.”54 
 
48. Id. at 2102 (Roberts, J., dissenting); see generally Debra Weiss, Supreme Court Clears Way for 
States to Collect Sales Tax from Internet Retailers, ABA J. (June 21, 2018, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_clears_way_for_states_to_collect_sales_t
ax_from_internet_reta) [http://perma.cc/54UN-S4TN] (quoting Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion 
in the Wayfair case). 
49. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 753–54 (1967). 
50. Id. at 754–55. 
51. Id. at 754. 
52. Id. at 755–56. 
53. Id. at 758. 
54. Id. at 759–60 (1967) (Justice Stewart continued: “[t]he many variations in rates of tax, in 
allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record keeping requirements could entangle National’s 
interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate 
claim to impose ‘a fair share of the cost of the local government.’”). 
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2. Discussion of Complete Auto Transit 
In 1977, consistent with the holding of Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court 
established the standard for applying the Commerce Clause to state taxes in 
Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady.55  Here, a corporation was “engaged in 
the business of transporting motor vehicles by motor carrier for General 
Motors Corporation.”56  The corporation claimed that the taxes assessed 
by the Mississippi Tax Commission were unconstitutional based on 
Supreme Court holdings that taxing on the privilege of engaging in an 
activity may not be applied to activities that are a part of interstate 
commerce.57  The Court affirmed a four-prong test, requiring: (1) a 
substantial nexus between the state and the taxpayer, (2) the tax not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, (3) the tax not be unfairly 
apportioned, and (4) that is unrelated to services provided by the state.58  In 
Complete Auto Transit Inc., the Court held that if these factors are met, the tax 
will be sustained under the Commerce Clause.59 
3. Discussion of Quill 
Quill Corporation, a mail-order house, refused to collect a use tax from 
customers in North Dakota because it had no offices, warehouses, or 
employees in North Dakota.60  The Supreme Court held that the Due 
Process Clause did not bar enforcement of use taxes if contact with the 
forum state made such enforcement reasonable.61  The Court concluded: 
(1) that Quill Corporation purposefully directed activities to North Dakota; 
(2) Quill Corporation’s contacts with North Dakota sufficiently satisfied 
due process; and (3) that the tax was related to the benefits Quill 
Corporation received from North Dakota.62  However, the Court also 
reasoned that if the only connection in a state is made by way of mail or a 
 
55. Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
56. See id. at 276. 
57. Id. at 277–78. 
58. See id. at 279 (reaffirming the four-prong test established in past cases). 
59. Id. 
60. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301 (1992). 
61. See id. at 308 (affirming the North Dakota Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Due Process 
Clause does not bar enforcement of that State’s use tax against Quill Corporation because the use tax 
is related to the benefits Quill Corporation receives from access to the State). 
62. See generally id. at 306–08 (determining Quill Corporation’s activities and benefits received 
from the state constitute sufficient contacts to satisfy due process). 
9
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common carrier, the seller does not meet the level of nexus required by the 
Commerce Clause.63 
Additionally, the Supreme Court emphasized that Congress has the ability 
and ultimate power to decide the extent and role of states in this analysis.64  
Put simply, retailers must be physically present in the state to satisfy the 
substantial nexus requirement set out in Complete Auto Transit.65  The Court 
based this decision on both Commerce Clause and stare decisis grounds.66  
First, the Court found that the requirements of due process were met 
regardless of physical presence in the taxing state.67  Second, stare decisis 
provides that courts will determine points in litigation according to 
precedent,68 though the Court put too much weight onto these factors, 
which preserved the “antiquated” physical presence rule.69  Although “the 
flaws with the rules were evident,” the Court believed that the issue was 
better suited for Congress.70 
4. Discussion of Wayfair 
In Wayfair, the Supreme Court reconsidered the validity of the physical 
presence rule set out in Bellas Hess and Quill.  Critics of Quill recognize that 
a nexus standard is necessary, but argue that the Supreme Court should 
 
63. Id. at 311. 
64. Id. at 318. 
65. Id. at 317. 
66. See id. at 317 (concluding the physical presence rule aligns with the principles of stare 
decisis); see also Swain, supra note 2, at 357 (“Quill Corporation fared better under the Commerce 
Clause.”). 
67.  
The requirements of due process are met irrespective of a corporation’s lack of physical presence 
in the taxing State.  Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process 
Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we 
overrule those holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process. 
Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 308. 
68. Id. at 317; see also Swain, supra note 2, at 317 (“The doctrine of stare decisis provides that 
courts will adhere to existing precedent and not disturb settled points.”). 
69. See Swain, supra note 2, at 360 (arguing “[t]he Court may have given too much weight to the 
pragmatic factors,” and thus “perpetuate[d] an antiquated rule”). 
70. Nicole Soulsby, Strength in Numbers: South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. and the Ripple Effect 
Occurring in State Legislatures to Circumvent the Quill Corp Physical Presence Test for Use Taxation, 
11 CHARLESTON L. REV. 583, 593–94 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court was borderline apologetic in 
defending the controversial physical presence rule—stating that . . . the flaws with the [physical 
presence] rule were evident, and that Congress can correct their decision by enacting legislation that 
does away with the rule . . . .”). 
10
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address the issue appropriately with regard to current times.71  In Wayfair, 
Justice Kennedy opined Quill actually created market distortions that the 
rule was meant to resolve.72  Further, the Supreme Court stated that 
“[p]hysical presence is not necessary to create a substantial nexus.”73  The 
Court also recognized that the physical presence rule provides an incentive 
for avoiding physical presence by acting as a tax shelter.74  The technological 
development since 1992 requires a different perspective on physical 
presence because consumers are now closer to retailers than ever before, 
regardless of the location of the storefront.75  The Supreme Court “should 
not maintain a rule that ignores these substantial virtual connections to the 
State.”76  Though Supreme Court precedent previously required a bright-
line physical presence rule, “[t]he rejection of the historic physical presence 
test leads to the conclusion that an economic presence can be sufficient to 
create the substantial nexus required under Complete Auto Transit[.]”77  
However, Wayfair only addressed the first prong (requiring a substantial 
nexus to the taxing state), so trial courts must still determine whether a tax 
meets the remaining requirements.78 
 
71. See Walter Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate Over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 
13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 549, 553 (2000) (“[W]hile nexus rules are clearly necessary in the existing 
environment . . . the debate should focus on rules that are appropriate to the twenty-first century, not 
the nineteenth.”). 
72. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2092 (2018) (“Quill creates rather than 
resolves market distortions.”). 
73. Id. at 2093. 
74. See id. at 2094 (“In effect, Quill has come to serve as a judicially created tax shelter for 
businesses that decide to limit their physical presence and still sell their goods and services to a State’s 
consumers[.]”). 
75. See id. at 2095 (“The ‘dramatic technological and social changes’ of our ‘increasingly 
interconnected economy’ mean that buyers are ‘closer to most major retailers’ than ever before—
‘regardless of how close or far the nearest storefront.’” (quoting Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 
575 U.S. 1, 18 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
76. Id. 
77. Erin M. Haney et al., Supreme Court Overturns the Quill Physical Presence Test for State Tax 
Collection, VARNUM ATTYS AT L. (June 21, 2018), https://www.varnumlaw.com/newsroom-
publications-supreme-court-overturns-the-quill-physical-presence-test-for-state-tax-collectio 
[http://perma.cc/U6XE-3CHG]. 
78. See id. (observing while the Wayfair decision held the “substantial nexus” requirement was 
satisfied, it did “not result in a conclusion as the case now must return to the trial court for a 
determination whether the tax at issue satisfies the remaining three requirements”). 
11
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III.    WHO GOT IT RIGHT AND WHY 
A state has “enforcement jurisdiction” over a person when a state has the 
ability to enforce the collection or payment of a tax.79  Though the growth 
in technology makes it more challenging to apply state tax laws, this alone 
should not suffice as an excuse for avoiding the issue or waiting for 
Congress to find a way to handle it.80  When Wayfair was decided: 
[N]ew sales tax legislation had been passed or was pending in thirty-two out 
of the forty-five states that impose a sales tax.  This legislation asserted either 
a nexus based on the sales activity in a state without regard to the seller’s 
physical presence in the state or imposed requirements similar to Colorado’s 
notice and reporting requirements previously discussed.  Additionally, forty-
one out of the forty-five states that impose a sales tax had instituted some 
form of legislation that expanded physical nexus, such as New York did in its 
Amazon statute, by using affiliate programs as a way of establishing a physical 
presence.81 
However, to determine a meaningful solution to the e-commerce problem, 
it must address who is subject to the tax and whether it is administrable.82 
A. Impact 
The rise of e-commerce resulted in a massive loss in state sales tax 
revenue.83  These losses not only take away from state services and 
infrastructure, but contribute to the “effectively tax-free status of Internet 
 
79. See Hayes R. Holderness, Taking Tax Due Process Seriously: The Give and Take of State Taxation, 
20 FLA. TAX REV. 371, 375 (2017) (“When a state has the ability to require a person to collect or pay 
a tax, the state has what is termed ‘enforcement jurisdiction’ over the person.  Understanding the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause for enforcement jurisdiction is critical to understanding when 
a state may require a remote vendor to collect and remit a use tax or pay an income tax.”). 
80. See Soulsby, supra note 70, at 619 (“South Dakota v. Wayfair is the right case for the Supreme 
Court to implement a system not defined solely by physical presence.”). 
81. Nick Surma, Overturning Quill: Why Wayfair Was Correctly Decided and What Lies Ahead, 
93 N.D. L. REV. 521, 538 (2018).  
82. See Hellerstein, supra note 71, at 550–54 (reviewing the main constitutional and practical 
issues states face in administering taxes against e-commerce vendors). 
83. See Holderness, supra note 79, at 377–78 (“The relative ease with which transactions can be 
initiated and completed over the Internet has contributed to, and likely accelerated, the growth of 
interstate transactions in the United States.  This growth is presumably good for the economy but 
presents challenges for many states as they struggle to apply their tax laws to these interstate 
transactions.  For example, one recent study found that the states’ struggles resulted in the non-
collection of $11.4 billion in sales and use tax revenues from sales made through e-commerce in 
2012.”). 
12
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sales.”84  Thus, we must review the impact that Wayfair had on the 
government, economy, businesses, consumers, and practitioners following 
the decision.  Doing so makes it clear that the Supreme Court’s binary 
decision was not enough to resolve the issues that followed. 
1. Government 
Though Wayfair re-examines state nexus questions, the implications of 
the decision “extend to other state-imposed taxes” as well.85  This comes 
after the opinion removed any doubts about physical presence by creating a 
bright-line rule.86  While Wayfair primarily resolved nexus issues, it has 
“effectively endorsed assertions by states that physical presence was not a 
prerequisite for the imposition of income tax and other entity-level taxes.”87  
This new ability to collect taxes from Internet retailers creates a revenue 
windfall.88  One of the reasons this issue arose was because there was a 
widespread problem in states enforcing use tax.89 
A significant impact on the government is that most states are not 
prepared to enforce these taxes without making considerable legislative 
changes.  Following the Supreme Court decision, the Tax Foundation 
suggests following what they term “the Wayfair checklist.”90  The checklist 
 
84. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Political Process Argument for Overruling Quill, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 
1177, 1199 (2017) (describing the Quill controversy and providing reasons why the Court should 
overturn the decision). 
85. See Chris Hopkins, Implications of Wayfair Beyond Sales Tax, FIN. EXECS. INT’L (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://www.financialexecutives.org/FEI-Daily/August-2018/Implications-of-Wayfair-Beyond-
Sales-Tax.aspx [http://perma.cc/NF6R-VXV7] (“[T]he Wayfair decision’s implications extend to other 
state-imposed taxes.”). 
86. See id. (“[I]mplicit in the Wayfair decision is an acceptance by the [C]ourt of a statutory 
bright-line activity threshold for the imposition of state tax under the commerce clause.”). 
87. Id. 
88. See Jon Chesto, In Wayfair Case, Supreme Court to Let States Collect Internet Sales Tax,  
BOS. GLOBE (June 21, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2018/06/21/supreme-court-
let-states-collect-internet-sales-tax/OZYKuuHcqN9yJgHYQPSWnK/story.html [http://perma.cc/ 
L9CF-WZ9A] (“The US Supreme Court on Thursday opened the door for states to collect more sales 
taxes from Internet retailers, dealing a blow to Boston-based online seller Wayfair but potentially 
creating a revenue windfall for Massachusetts.”). 
89. See William R. Stromsem et al., Sales Taxes After Wayfair-Challenges and Opportunities for CPAs, 
TSCPA (July 2018), https://www.tscpa.org/advocacy/governmental-affairs/news/sales-taxes-after-
wayfair-challenges-and-opportunities-for-cpas [http://perma.cc/LAN9-HE49] (“One of the reasons 
South Dakota asserted economic nexus for sales taxes was the widespread lack of compliance and 
problems with enforcing their use tax.”). 
90. Joseph Bishop-Henchman et al., Post-Wayfair Options for States, TAX FOUND.  
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180904165435/Tax-Foundation-FF6091.pdf 
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is satisfied by “adopting a de minimis threshold, explicitly rejecting retroactive 
enforcement, and adhering to uniformity and simplification rules in the 
Streamlines Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA).”91  The Supreme 
Court has strongly encouraged SSUTA.92  State policy choices include 
deciding on the generosity of the threshold to adopt, the qualifying period, 
the enforcement date, the inclusion of local taxes, and how to use 
revenues.93  In making a law that follows the new constitutional standard, 
states must look at the following factors: safe harbor, no retroactive 
collection, single state-level administration, uniformed definitions, 
simplified tax rate structure, software (provided by the state), and 
immunity.94 
Though South Dakota is compliant with this checklist, the Tax 
Foundation has reviewed state statutes and regulations and classified them 
according to their status.95  There are states that are compliant with the 
checklist; those that should proceed with caution; states that should only 
proceed after making legislative changes; those that are not compliant; and 
states with no sales tax.96  Texas is one of the majority of states that should 
only proceed to tax Internet sellers after making legislative changes.97  Texas 
would have to undergo significant simplifications because it is not a SSUTA 
member and has 1,594 tax jurisdictions.98  Additionally, Texas does not 
adhere to uniform definitions or provide tax lookup software.99  The 
Tax Foundation suggests Texas “should pursue SSUTA membership 
and/or significant simplification of its local sales tax . . . .”100  Policymakers 
 
[http://perma.cc/7TEN-L7K4].  The Tax Foundation is a tax policy nonprofit and research institution 
founded in 1932. 
91. Id. 
92. See Sofia Morales, The Amazon Tax: Collecting the Use Tax in the Aftermath of the New York 
Appellate Court’s Recent Holding, 13 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 56, 80 (2012) (“[T]he SSUTA is not only 
appropriate but has been strongly encouraged by the Supreme Court.”). 
93. Bishop-Henchman et al., supra note 90. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. (classifying states as “green lights,” “flashing yellow lights,” “steady yellow lights,” or 
“red lights” according to their completion of the Wayfair checklist). 
97. See id. at 18 (“[Texas] should pursue SSUTA membership and/or significant simplification 
of its local sales taxes prior to pursuing enabling legislation similar to South Dakota’s.  The Texas 
Comptroller has issued a statement inviting input for future legislation and disavowing any retroactive 
application.”). 
98. Id. 
99. See id. (“[Texas] does not adhere to common definitions or provide base/rate lookup 
software . . . .”). 
100. See id. 
14
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should focus on statutory longevity by making decisions that are likely 
constitutional, immune from suit, and uphold voluntary compliance.101 
2. Economy 
In an interview with George Kelemen, CEO of the Texas Retailers 
Association, Kelemen commented that Quill was decided two years before 
“the first online sale in history.”102  Twenty-six years later, the 
Department of Commerce now claims that $450 billion of retail sales, or 
more than 13% of all retail sales, are conducted online.103  Kelemen focuses 
on fairness, stating the physical presence systems put brick-and-mortar 
retailers at an 8.25% disadvantage compared to out-of-state retailers.104  In 
Texas, the tax rate by which traditional retailers are disadvantaged is 6.25%, 
but local tax jurisdictions impose a 2% tax that combines to equal that 
8.25%.105  While states do collect from some big chain online retailers that 
have physical presence, there is an estimated $13 billion in potential tax flow 
from websites that are not paying.106  Bill Longley, legislative counsel at the 
Texas Municipal League, commented: “It’s not a big- or small-city issue.  It 
could theoretically increase the sales tax base in every city across the 
state.”107  Texas does not have an income tax, so it relies on sales taxes.108  
Sales tax dollars constitute more than 50% of sales tax revenue along with 
city revenues as well.109  A previous comptroller estimate shows that these 
taxes could generate an additional $800 million for the state and another 
 
101. See id. at 21 (“[P]olicymakers should build systems meant to last; ones that are surely 
constitutional, that are free from the threat of lawsuit, and that uphold a system of voluntary 
compliance.”). 
102. Paul Flahive, How Supreme Court Decision Could Mean $1 Billion For Texas, TEX. PUB. RADIO 




105. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.051 (imposing use tax and defining the rate as the same 
percentage as sales tax); see also State Rates, supra note 9 (offering an option to calculate local taxes in 
Texas based on address). 
106. Flahive, supra note 102. 
107. Id. 
108. Paul Takahashi, How the Supreme Court Ruling on Online Sales Taxes Affects Texas Online 
Shoppers, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (June 21, 2018), https://www.expressnews.com/business/ 
local/article/How-the-Supreme-Court-ruling-on-online-sales-13014783.php [http://perma.cc/3G 
WL-VNA4]. 
109. Flahive, supra note 102. 
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$200 million for cities.110  For these reasons, local retailers have complained 
about the creation of an unfair marketplace.111  With somewhere 
between 10,000 and 12,000 different taxing authorities across the United 
States, this complicates business compliance.112 
3. Businesses 
Both large and small businesses alike will face compliance issues.113  The 
major impacts on these businesses can be broken down into the following: 
(1) the state must individually tax across boundaries, (2) Internet retailers 
must track all sales and tax changes where they conduct business, 
(3) Internet retailers must establish systems to collect sales tax, (4) Internet 
retailers will need to reevaluate bottom line profit and loss numbers, and 
(5) brick-and-mortar retailers will benefit from consumers who used to state 
taxes by shopping online.114  This Comment takes the position, along with 
others such as David Agrawal, that compliance costs fall disproportionately 
on small businesses.115  “Smaller online companies may find themselves 
subject to [tax] nexus in new jurisdictions and are less likely to have 
multistate . . . software and in-house expertise.”116  This will add to their 
compliance costs by potentially requiring small businesses to hire someone 
for compliance efforts or using third party consultants.117 
Larger businesses have more factors to consider, such as the physical 
presence of their warehouse or even delivery vehicles.118  Another problem 
arising in large businesses that adds to the complexity are cases where online 
retailers simply serve as platforms for third party sales.119  Such 
circumstances have led the Texas Comptroller to suggest amending the 
 
110. See id. 
111. See Takahashi, supra note 108 (“Brick-and-mortar retailers have also complained that the 
precedent creates an unfair marketplace, putting them at a disadvantage to Internet businesses.”). 
112. Flahive, supra note 102. 
113. See Stromsem et al., supra note 89 (“Wayfair will greatly complicate state sales tax 
compliance for smaller companies. . . . Larger online companies likely have sales or use tax nexus in 
many states, and some possibly in all states[] . . . .”). 
114. Tom Wheelwright, How Will the ‘Wayfair’ Supreme Court Decision Affect Retailers? 5 Ways., 
LMTONLINE (July 18, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lmtonline.com/news/article/How-Will-the-
Wayfair-Supreme-Court-Decision-13082332.php [http://perma.cc/37TH-XTKJ]. 
115. David Agrawal is an assistant professor at the University of Kentucky, where he teaches 
public policy and economics.  Flahive, supra note 102. 
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definition of “seller” and “retailer” in the Texas Tax Code to include 
marketplace platforms.120 
Another concern among businesses is the retroactive application of 
Wayfair.121  This is because many states do not have a statute of limitations 
for assessments against taxpayers.122  Though Rhode Island is the only state 
that has announced potentially applying Wayfair retroactively, statements 
made in briefs are not binding.123  While Texas continues to review rules, 
it is important to stress that businesses should not be subjected to taxation 
without bounds if remote sellers do not have a physical presence in 
Texas.124  There is also the fear that, along with owing back taxes, 
e-commerce merchants would owe interest on those back taxes.125  Before, 
the physical presence test may have made businesses reluctant to have 
offices or warehouses in other states.126  However, because of Wayfair, 
businesses may begin to expand activities which will ultimately benefit 
consumers by enhancing sales and improving customer service.127 
The New York Times goes so far as to relate this to “taxation without 
representation” because it puts the responsibility on the seller to calculate, 
collect, and remit sales taxes to the home state of the buyer even when the 
retailer has no stores, employees, voting power, or political voice.128  States 
have been losing out on billions of dollars in tax revenue even though some 
larger Internet retailers “have begun collecting sales tax regardless 
of . . . physical presence.”129  It is up to the Texas Comptroller of Public 
 
120. Id.; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.008 (defining the terms “seller” and “retailer”). 




125. Morales, supra note 92, at 83. 
126. Stromsem et al., supra note 89. 
127. See id. (“With nexus possibly determined by revenues and the location of online buyers 
instead of a seller’s physical presence, companies may be less reluctant to establish an in-state physical 
presence if they will be subject to a state’s tax collection obligation under a state’s economic nexus 
standard in any event.”). 
128. Jessica Melugin, Supreme Court’s Wayfair Decision Will Hurt Online Shopping, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/supreme-court-wayfair-south-
dakota-online-shopping.html [https://perma.cc/J3PG-Q595]. 
129. Mark Walsh, Opinion Analysis: Court Expands States’ Ability to Require Internet Retailers to Collect 
Sales Tax, SCOTUSBLOG (June 21, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-
court-expands-states-ability-to-require-internet-retailers-to-collect-sales-tax/ [http://perma.cc/M6 
6M-FGJU].  See generally Daniel Tyler Cowan, Recent Development, New York’s Unconstitutional Tax on 
the Internet: Amazon.com v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance and the Dormant 
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Accounts to implement the principles of Supreme Court decisions in a 
manner that best serves the state itself, its citizens, and the businesses 
operating in the state.130  The amount of tax collection and revenue increase 
will depend on how the agency implements and resolves issues that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling raises.131 
Though there is much to gain, states struggle to impose these tax 
obligations.132  Sellers that engage in e-commerce carry a heavy burden 
because compliance requires: 
a seller [to] determine within which states it has nexus, whether the items sold 
are taxable in the consumer’s state, and whether a customer is exempt from 
the tax.  In addition to these steps, a seller in compliance must maintain 
adequate books and records, the standards for which vary from state to 
state.133 
Other struggles include unique sourcing problems, such as when no delivery 
address is provided or when billing information is inadequate.134 
4. Consumers 
On the other hand, from the consumer perspective, many believe Wayfair 
diminishes the beneficial rivalry that essentially allows them to “vote  
with their wallets.”135  Because states can essentially export their tax policies 
to tax businesses in other states, many argue that the online buyer is put at 
a disadvantage.136  It creates fewer political consequences on businesses  
and states, minimizing the incentive to maintain reasonable tax  
 
Commerce Clause, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1423, 1423–24 (2010) (explaining the “Amazon Tax” that requires 
out-of-state retailers to collect use tax if they have marketing affiliates in the state producing at least 
$10,000 in sales). 
130. Press Release, Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accts., Comptroller Issues Initial Guidance on 
Remote Seller Sales Tax Decision by U.S. Supreme Court (June 27, 2018), https://comptroller. 
texas.gov/about/media-center/news/2018/180627-wayfair.php [http://perma.cc/K99K-5GQ2]. 
131. Id. 
132. See generally Sara Schoenfeld, Much Ado About Nexus: The States Struggle to Impose Sales Tax 
Obligations on Out-of-State Sellers Engaged in E-Commerce, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 263, 280 (2013); (describing how state revenue losses from uncollected sales taxes are motivating 
states to “apply[] their state sales tax collection laws to out-of-state vendors more aggressively”). 
133. Id. at 282 (citations omitted). 
134. Id. at 282–83. 
135. Melugin, supra note 128. 
136. See, e.g., id. 
18
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rates.137  This decision likely means consumers will see an increase in online 
prices.138 
However, this Comment does not agree with this position from the 
consumer perspective.  The Tax Foundation has made an effort to clarify 
Wayfair and eliminate consumers’ confusion related to the decision.139  A 
major concern of consumers is whether Wayfair will make online purchases 
more expensive or hurt e-commerce.140  In short, e-commerce will not be 
hurt because e-commerce retailers will have to collect the same taxes 
collected by every other retailer.141  These are not new taxes, but taxes that 
should have always been reported and paid—whether by retailers or 
consumers.142  Additionally, even if retailers had to increase prices to 
comply, Internet retailers have many other benefits over brick-and-mortar 
retailers.143  Online shoppers still benefit from the ease, convenience, and 
wider selection that e-commerce has to offer.  As the collection of e-
commerce taxes “grew from almost zero to half of all sales, e-commerce has 
continued to grow sharply.”144  Thus, Wayfair “is almost certainly too late” 
to create a dramatic shift from shopping online to shopping in brick-and-
mortar stores.145 
5. Practitioners 
The decision also creates opportunities and challenges for those whose 
job it is to comply with the new requirements.146  When the Supreme Court 
looked at South Dakota’s law, six features were designed to prevent any 
 
137. See id. (“With fewer political consequences, there is less incentive to keep tax rates 
reasonable.”). 
138. Takahashi, supra note 108. 
139. See generally Joseph Bishop-Henchman, What Does the Wayfair Decision Really Mean for States,  
Businesses, and Consumers?, TAX FOUND. (June 9, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/what-does-the-
wayfair-decision-really-mean-for-states-businesses-and-consumers/ [http://perma.cc/P3L8-HXNX] 
(eliminating confusion about the Wayfair decision by providing answers to interpretation questions). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. See id. (“Internet purchases were not exempt from tax[.]”). 
143. See id. (“[E]-commerce’s strengths over brick-and-mortar are more about convenience, 
wider selection, and lower costs, it’s unlikely this decision will hurt large e-commerce firms.”). 
144. Id. 
145. Alana Semuels, Will a New Supreme Court Decision Change Online Shopping?, ATLANTIC 
(June 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/06/what-the-supreme-
courts-decision-on-online-sales-tax-means/563405/ [http://perma.cc/8FJZ-H24Z]. 
146. See Stromsem et al., supra note 89 (describing the benefits and challenges the Wayfair 
decision imposes). 
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undue burden on interstate commerce: (1) a safe harbor that would exclude 
small retailers (2) no retroactive tax collection (3) single administration on 
the state-level (4) simplified tax structure (5) uniform definitions and rules, 
and (6) state software access with immunity privileges for those who rely 
and try to comply.147  States that attempt to collect sales taxes on e-
commerce without meeting these provisions will face a legal challenge as 
they try to rationalize their statutes using the Wayfair decision as a guide to 
what is permissible.  The current software will need to be reprogrammed in 
order to meet compliance requirements as well.148 
However, many compliance services will likely be offered to large e-
commerce sellers.149  “Congress could also potentially pass RTPA,” which 
would provide protections limiting interstate audits, requiring states to help 
pay for integration software, and establishing a sales threshold to exempt 
small businesses from some rules to alleviate the burden on these 
retailers.150  South Dakota has received overwhelming support in Wayfair.  
Many states will likely follow in updating registration, reporting, and 
collection statutes in response to the decision.151  Other states are 
challenging or in the process of challenging different aspects of nexus 
requirements.152  Retailers should expect states to expand their assertion in 
the context of tax collection.153  Tax compliance entities will be monitoring 
economic activity, and that will affect thousands of jurisdictions, locally and 
statewide.154  Some states are targeting e-commerce groups, while others 
are considering enacting notice and reporting rules.155  For example, 
Missouri uses an economic nexus approach in what is now termed the 
 
147.  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099–2100 (2018); Bishop-Henchman, 
supra note 139. 
148. See Stromsem et al., supra note 89 (“Computers will need to be reprogrammed to capture 
sales by taxing jurisdictions.”). 
149. See Bishop-Henchman, supra note 139 (“It is likely that large e-commerce platforms will 
provide sales tax compliance services for their sellers.”). 
150. Id. 
151. See Scott E. Vincent, Report: Taxes in Your Practice: Supreme Court Overturns Physical Presence 
Standard for Sales Tax Nexus, 74 J. MO. B. 201, 202 (2018) (“Practitioners will need to monitor new laws, 
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“Amazon Law” or the Amazon Tax.156  More specifically, the Missouri 
statute requires Internet retailers with click-through arrangements to collect 
use taxes.157 
B. Types of Proposals 
Several approaches can be made in attempting to propose a way to tax or 
not to tax e-commerce.  In 1999, the Advisory Commission on Electronic 
Commerce (ACEC) invited interested parties to submit proposals, which 
ACEC evaluated based on eighteen criteria.158  ACEC focused on 
simplification, changes to taxation, burden on sellers, discrimination, 
international application, technology, privacy, and constitutionality.159 
ACEC thoroughly discussed the constitutionality of proposals.  It first 
divided the proposals into categories based on how restrictive the proposals 
were.160  ACEC defined radically restrictive proposals as those that would 
ban e-commerce taxation altogether in a broad range of transactions.161  An 
example would be the Internet Tax Elimination Act that was cosponsored 
by Ohio Representatives Kasich and Boehner.162  Another example would 
be the proposal to prohibit both sales and use taxes on e-commerce 
transactions from businesses to consumers.163  Moderately restrictive 
proposals are those that significantly immunize e-commerce economic 
activity.164  Moderate proposals impose specific limits on state taxation 
power.165  The eCommerce Coalition, including businesses such as Cisco 
Systems, Inc., Citigroup, Microsoft, and Wal-Mart, proposed an approach 
that would require establishing standards for the state to simplify the current 
 
156. See MO. REV. STAT. § 144.605 (2017) (describing the Missouri Amazon Law); see also 
Vincent, supra note 151, at 202 (“Missouri has what is sometimes called an ‘Amazon’ law, which takes 
an economic nexus approach similar to the South Dakota Act in Wayfair.”).  See generally Cowan, 
supra note 129, at 1423–24 (defining the Amazon use tax nexus through the production of $10,000 in 
sales by marketing affiliates in the state). 
157. MO. REV. STAT. § 144.605(2)(e) (2017). 
158. See Kendall L. Houghton & Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce: 
Perspectives on Proposals for Change and Their Constitutionality, 2000 BYU L. REV. 9, 45 (2000). 
159. Id. at 45–47. 
160. See id. at 47–48 (separating proposals by either restrictiveness or simplification). 
161. Id. at 48. 
162. Id. 
163. This proposal was advanced by Virginal Governor Gilmore.  Id. 
164. Id. at 49. 
165. Id. 
21
Mendez Lopez: Wayfair or No Fair
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
758 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:737 
system.166  Simplification was a common theme throughout the proposals, 
while others focused on technology or origin.167 
C. Government Intervention 
Though there seems to have been some government involvement 
throughout the course of history, it has not been enough to resolve the 
nexus issues.  In 1997, five years after Quill, the Internet Tax Freedom Act 
was introduced.168  The purpose of the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) 
was to establish a national policy against interfering with interstate e-
commerce.169  Because it was met with heavy opposition, it did not garner 
support until Congress passed a weaker version of the original in 1998.170  
It banned both multiple and discriminatory taxes on e-commerce.171  ITFA 
defines e-commerce broadly to include transactions conducted over or 
through Internet access.172  Under ITFA, multiple taxes are imposed by the 
government on an e-commerce transaction that is also subject to taxation 
by another government.173  A discriminatory tax occurs when the tax 
policies place e-commerce at a disadvantage compared to more traditional 
or brick-and-mortar means.174  A tax is also considered discriminatory if it 
places the tax collection burden on a third party in an e-commerce 
transaction.175  While these were important moves by Congress, it only 
postponed decisions which Congress has still chosen to avoid. 
In 1999, Congress continued its efforts by approving a non-binding 
resolution to encourage Clinton to seek a ban on e-commerce tariffs.176  
 
166. See id. at 49–50 (“The eCommerce Coalition . . . urged the Commission to recommend 
congressional legislation . . . for state-initiated simplification . . . .”). 
167. See id. at 50–52. 
168. See Kevin J. Smith, Internet Taxes: Congressional Efforts to Control States’ Ability to Tax the World 
Wide Web, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, at ¶ {5} (2000), https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1100&context=jolt [https://perma.cc/EQT2-XBY7] (“[T]he state may 
receive its tax dollar at the expense of the small businesses.”). 
169. Id. ¶ {10}. 
170. See id. ¶¶ {10}–{11} (“The ITFA was initially met with strong opposition from organized 
groups such as the National 39 League of Cities, the National Governor’s Association and others.  
After eighteen months of debate, Congress finally passed the ITFA in 1998.”). 
171. See id. ¶ {11} (listing which tax levies ITFA bars). 
172. Id. ¶ {43}. 
173. See id. ¶ {50} (defining multiple taxes). 
174. See id. ¶ {45} (defining discriminatory taxes). 
175. Id. ¶ {47}. 
176. See id. ¶ {8} (“In the Fall of 1999, both houses of Congress approved a non-binding 
resolution encouraging President Clinton to seek a permanent international ban on tariffs on electronic 
commerce.”). 
22
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2019], No. 3, Art. 5
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss3/5
  
2020] COMMENT 759 
 
The resolution called upon the World Trade Organization to negotiate and 
enact a moratorium on e-commerce tariffs.177  One of the problems with 
the rise of technology and e-commerce transactions is the Internet nexus, 
the main point of discussion. 
Believing that ITFA would soon expire, legislatures and governmental 
agencies reassessed e-commerce policies, specifically those that affect 
economic objectives.178  Potential e-commerce tax revenue raises concerns 
on how to proportion the income among states.179  Another important 
consideration is that the classification of e-commerce affects how the 
income will be sourced.180 
Congress has also made efforts to aid in the debate.  In 1999, Congress 
introduced H.R. 3252 as the Internet Tax Elimination Act.181  It amended 
ITFA to make the prohibition on sales or use tax on e-commerce 
permanent.182  Then, in 2000, the congressmen who proposed ITFA 
introduced the Internet Non-Discrimination Act (INDA), making ITFA 
permanent.183  H.R. 3709, or the INDA, permanently extended provisions 
that prohibited multiple or discriminatory taxes on e-commerce.184  More 
recently, Congress introduced H.R. 6724, the Protecting Businesses from 
Burdensome Compliance Cost Act.185  The bill limits the authority of states 
and subdivisions to collect taxes owed and to collect information incident 
 
177. See id. (“It also calls upon the WTO to enact a permanent moratorium on electronic 
commerce tariffs.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 
178. See generally Jonathan Bick, Implementing E-Commerce Tax Policy, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 597 
(2000) (introducing e-commerce tax proposals in context of the expiration of IFTA). 
179. This also has implications on sales and use taxes, which are discussed in the introduction 
of the comment.  See id. at 598 (describing “the misclassification of the product and erroneous 
treatment for tax purposes [as] a real danger”). 
180. There are three classification options: tangible personal property, intangible property, or 
services. Id.  E-commerce categorized as tangible personal property is normally sourced to the 
destination state, while intangible property and services are sourced to the vendor state.  See id. at 598–
600 (2000). 
181. H.R. 3252, 106th Cong. (1999). 
182. Id. 
183. See Smith, supra note 168, ¶ {80} (“[They said they would introduce the Internet Non-
Discriminatory Act (INDA) that will make the ITFA permanent.”). 
184. H.R. 3709, 106th Cong. (2000). 
185. This bill was introduced September 6, 2018.  See H.R. 6724, 115th Cong. (2018) (“To limit 
the authority of a state to require remote sellers to collect taxes and fees owed by purchasers then 
located in such State incident to their purchases of goods and services from such sellers, and for other 
purposes.”). 
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760 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:737 
to the purchase.186  Congress also introduced H.R. 6824 as the Online Sales 
Simplicity and Small Business Relief Act of 2018.187  This bill prohibits 
states from imposing tax collection duties on certain remote sellers.188  It 
also bans retroactive taxation of e-commerce.189  The bill aims to phase in 
compliance in an orderly manner.190  However, it does include an 
exemption for small business remote sellers: 
In the case of a sale made by a small business remote seller, no State may 
impose a sales tax collection duty on any person other than the purchaser if 
the sale is made on or after June 21, 2018, and before the date that is 30 days 
after the date on which the states develop and Congress approves an interstate 
compact, applicable to the State and sale, governing the imposition of tax 
collection duties on remote sellers.191 
H.R. 6824 also delves into the sense of Congress: 
It is the sense of Congress that the States should develop an interstate 
compact for the collection of sales tax by remote sellers that identifies a clearly 
defined minimum substantial nexus between the remote seller and the taxing 
State, that simplifies registration, collection, remittance, auditing, and other 
compliance processes to the greatest extent possible in order to avoid undue 
burdens on interstate commerce, and that, due to such simplification, 
eliminates the need for the continuation of the small business remote seller 
exemption under section 4.192 
Another similar bill introduced by Congress is H.R. 7184, the No 
Retroactive Online Taxation Act of 2018.193 
 
186. See H.R. 6724, 115th Cong. (2018) (providing exceptions and definitions within the bill). 
187. This bill was introduced September 13, 2018.  See H.R. 6824, 115th Cong. (2018) (“To 
prohibit States from retroactively imposing a sales tax collection duty on a remote seller, and for other 
purposes.”). 
188. See id. (defining a remote seller as “a person without a physical presence in the State who 
makes a sale in the State”). 
189. See id. 
190. See id. (“A state may impose a sales tax collection duty on a remote seller for a sale that 
occurs after January 1, 2019.”). 
191. See id. (defining a small business remote seller as “a remote seller with gross annual receipts 
in the United States during the preceding calendar year in an amount that is not more than 
$10,000,000”). 
192. Id. 
193. This bill was introduced on November 28, 2018.  See H.R. 7184, 115th Cong. (2018) (“To 
provide for a ban on the retroactive taxation of internet commerce, and for other purposes.”). 
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States have also attempted to regulate the matter.  The goal for states is 
to create legislation that will aid in their efforts and uphold constitutional 
scrutiny.194  For example, in November 2018, Texas introduced S.B. 70.195  
The purpose of S.B. 70 is to provide an “optional, simplified means of 
computing the amount of local use tax remote sellers are required to collect” 
as a result of Wayfair.196  The act intends to do so by amending the Tax 
Code and Government Code.197 
IV.    SUGGESTING A POTENTIAL RESOLUTION 
A. Current Responses 
In creating a potential resolution to e-commerce taxation issues, it is 
useful to look at other states and how they have reacted to the Supreme 
Court’s decision to overrule the physical presence test to determine nexus 
sufficiency.  Since Wayfair was decided, many states responded by issuing 
administrative guidance or announcing that they are contemplating their 
next steps before taking action.198  In their responses, most states have 
focused on the overruling of the physical presence requirement.199  While 
most states have chosen to avoid interpreting what is unduly burdensome, 
Texas has proven to be an exception.200 
 
194. Joseph Bishop-Henchman, Supreme Court Decides Wayfair Online Sales Tax Case, TAX 
FOUND. (June 21, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/supreme-court-decides-wayfair-online-sales-tax-
case/ [http://perma.cc/S8DY-UV8R] (“In the states, a reminder, 31 states currently have laws taxing 
internet sales.  Today’s decision will certainly change how states look at these laws but we may see 
states trying to see if their versions could survive even if they are less simplified and direct than South 
Dakota’s law.”). 
195. See Tex. S.B. 70, 86th Leg., R.S. 2019 (“[R]elating to a single use tax rate as an alternative 
to combined local use tax rates for computing the amount of local use taxes remote sellers are required 
to collect and to the allocation of tax revenue collected at that rate.”). 
196. See id. (referring to South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018)). 
197. See generally id. (setting forth suggested changes in laws to simplify computation). 
198. See generally Jeffery Reed, A Range of State Responses After Wayfair, JD SUPRA (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-range-of-state-responses-after-wayfair-48789/ [http://perma. 
cc/8S2U-J7CT] (summarizing a variety of state reactions to the decision). 
199. See id. (“[S]tate responses have generally focused on . . . the lifting of the physical presence 
requirement.”). 
200. See id. (asserting Texas has deviated from interpreting the Court’s unduly burdensome 
component). 
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Some states took Wayfair as a green light and followed the decision by 
issuing guidance and praise to the decision almost immediately.201  These 
states believed the decision was consistent with the current nexus sales 
tax law.202  Examples of states that followed this approach are: Alabama, 
Hawaii, Iowa, North Dakota, and Rhode Island.203 
Other states that did not enact laws serving a similar function quickly 
announced that they would try to act on the decision for state benefit.204  
However, states have shown different ways to do so.  For example, Utah 
is working on legislation to force remote sellers to collect taxes.205  
Another approach taken by states such as South Carolina and Wisconsin 
show states intend to use force by administrative fiat.206  Meanwhile, 
other states are looking at their present statutes to determine whether 
additional regulations will be necessary to force tax collection by remote 
sellers.207 
Wayfair created a feeling of obligation among states to make an official 
announcement regardless of whether they were ready to make that 
decision following the opinion, leading to ambiguity and confusion.  One 
example is the Maryland Comptroller, which issued a question and answer 
document.208  The document addressed whether a seller not currently 
collecting sales tax must now do so following the opinion.209  The 
Maryland Comptroller responded by providing a link to the Supreme 
Court opinion, stating that sellers should review and analyze the decision 
in the case “to identify how it affects you.”210 
 
201. See id. (explaining some states reacted with enthusiasm by the Court’s decision by providing 
praise). 
202. See id. (“[C]oncluding [the decision] is consistent with the state’s already-enacted economic 
nexus sales tax law.”). 
203. See id. (listing the states following the approach consistent with current nexus sales tax law). 
204. See id. (explaining many states are reviewing their current code to ensure remote sellers will 
collect sales and use tax). 
205. See id. (claiming Utah is attempting to force remote sellers to collect taxes). 
206. An administrative fiat is an authoritative decree, sanction, or order that is issued that does 
not necessarily have the force of law.  See id. (“It might be thought that a statute would be necessary.  
But the logic seems to be that the general state definitions . . . are already sufficiently broad to cover 
remote sellers.”). 
207. See id. (“[S]tates are . . . determining whether additional legislation or regulations may be 
necessary.”). 
208. See, e.g., id. (describing how vague the Maryland Comptroller responded in a question and 
answer document). 
209. See id. (“One of the questions asks if a seller not currently collecting and remitting Maryland 
sales tax needs to begin doing so in the wake of the opinion.”). 
210. See id. (encouraging sellers to review the Wayfair decision to understand its impact). 
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The Texas Comptroller of Public Accountants also seemed hesitant to 
disclose any specific guidance.211  The Comptroller’s office was brief, 
mentioning that it “expects the Texas Legislature to play an important 
role in addressing key issues when they return in January 2019.”212  
However, unlike most states, the Texas Comptroller acknowledged the 
unduly burdensome test.213  The Comptroller’s office stated that “in 
order to avoid posing an undue burden on interstate commerce, the state 
will likely relieve some out-of-state sellers from collection 
responsibilities.”214  It did not provide any details on how it intended to 
balance the changes.215 
Another interesting example is New Hampshire because it is one of the 
few states that does not impose a sales tax.  New Hampshire has taken an 
approach that seeks to protect businesses from being forced to collect 
instead of attempting to collect revenue from online sellers.216  
Governor Chris Sununu and state leaders have vowed to fight the 
Supreme Court case on sales tax by suggesting a strategy that would 
require states to notify the New Hampshire State Department of Justice 
before states audit a New Hampshire remote seller.217  They also want to 
allow the state’s Department of Justice the opportunity to weigh in on the 
constitutionality of the tax obligation and allow the Department of Justice 
to block tax collection by filing a suit to protect New Hampshire 
businesses.218 
 
211. See generally Press Release, supra note 130 (“The agency anticipates that the state and local 
governments will see tax collections increase, but the amount depends on the implementation and 
resolution of several significant issues raised by the Supreme Court’s ruling.”). 
212. Id. 
213. See Reed, supra note 198 (“[T]he thinking from the Texas Comptroller’s guidance appears 
to be that a delicate balance must be struck between forcing additional remote sellers to collect tax 
while also taking steps to ensure the tax collection regime is not unduly burdensome in the abstract 
and as applied to certain remote sellers.”). 
214. Press Release, supra note 130. 
215. See id. (“More specific estimates will be available as the implementation and legislative 
process continues.”). 
216. See Reed, supra note 198 (“New Hampshire has vowed to ‘fight back’ by seeking to ‘erect 
every possible . . . permissible legal and procedural hurdle to prevent other states from forcing our 
businesses to collect and use taxes.”). 
217. See id. (referencing a press release from New Hampshire Governor Chris Sununu). 
218. See id. (purporting New Hampshire’s strategy is to allow “the New Hampshire Department 
of Justice to the opportunity to opine on the constitutionality of the tax collection obligation assertion, 
potentially even filing suit to block any attempt to impose tax collection on the New Hampshire 
Business.”). 
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B. Criticism 
While both significant praise and criticism have followed Wayfair, one 
question comes to mind: is there a better way?  This analysis will discuss the 
benefits of physical presence and keeping with the Quill decision versus 
defenses for doing away with the requirement as decided in the Wayfair 
decision. 
One perspective is that the physical presence test is the better standard 
because it is a bright-line rule that is easily understood by taxpayers, and it 
is not subject to interpretation.219  The physical presence test is also favored 
because it is believed to reduce the probability that a business will be subject 
to multiple, or double, taxation.220  Those that prefer Quill also claim that 
it is a more stable and predictable test, which leads to lower administrative 
and compliance costs.221  Quill supporters understand that complications 
may arise where intangible property and e-commerce are involved, but they 
still believe that there is no reason to abandon the physical presence rule.222  
They believe the issues can be resolved by uniform state definitions for the 
location of the sales to establish nexus.223 
Further, many find that Wayfair is not fair.224  Those that agree with this 
point of view believe that the decision “may encourage some aggressive 
states (California and New York come to mind), and some desperate to 
collect more taxes (New Jersey, Connecticut, and Illinois, for instance) to 
try to squeeze much more in revenue out of this ruling than South Dakota 
did.”225 
 
219. See Vivian Lei, Geoffrey v. Commissioner: The Fall of “Toys R Us” and the Rise of “Tax R 
Us”, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 340, 361 (2010) (providing policy arguments in support of the physical 
presence test). 
220. See id. (arguing Quill helps to reduce multiple taxation of a corporation by various states). 
221. See id. (describing a major effect of Quill is its ability to provide “stability and predictability 
in the state and local tax systems by lowering administrative and compliance costs.”). 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 361–62. 
224. See Steven Malagna, Why Wayfair Isn’t Fair, CITY J. (June 26, 2018), https://www.city-
journal.org/html/why-wayfair-isnt-fair-15990.html [http://perma.cc/W24X-3FQS] (commenting on 
the need for Congress to set limits in response to the Supreme Court’s decision on Internet taxes). 
225. Id.  This fear is based on the fact that the opinion does not define a nexus standard.  See id. 
(“What Wayfair mainly does is admit that the old standard of physical presence is no longer adequate, 
which means that states can now set a much lower threshold for when they can start requiring a 
merchant to collect taxes.”). 
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On the other hand, others favor the result of the Wayfair opinion.226  
Supporters believe that if Amazon is already doing it, then other businesses 
should be able to follow, especially since software will be made available to 
facilitate the change.227 
C. Proposal 
Looking to the future of e-commerce taxes, “[w]hether the change is 
mandated by Congress, a Supreme Court decision or just the fear of bad 
publicity, the sooner businesses get ready to collect state sales taxes in every 
jurisdiction around the country, the better off they will be.”228  The ideal 
solution will provide incentives229 and eliminate discrimination.230 
The Supreme Court should have answered the issue more directly in a 
way that would resolve the debate.231  Some believe this issue rests solely 
in the hands of Congress.232  However, Congress may not be in the best 
position to make this decision if it means that “there are potent concentrated 
interests on both sides of potential legislation [that makes a] stalemate seem 
 
226. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (2018) (“Though Quill was wrong 
on its own terms when it was decided in 1992, since then the Internet revolution has made its earlier 
error all the more egregious and harmful.”). 
227. Michael C. Dorf, Congress, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Wayfair Case, DORF ON L. 
(June 21, 2018), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/06/congress-dormant-commerce-clause-and.html 
[http://perma.cc/DA6E-ZZ3A] (arguing Wayfair is defensible on its merits). 
228. Alex Paladino, E-commerce Companies don’t pay Local Sales Taxes. They Need to get Serious  
About That., RECODE (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.recode.net/2018/4/17/17248244/ecommerce-
government-local-internet-sales-tax-supreme-court-trump-amazon [http://perma.cc/S9PJ-2PB9]. 
229. See generally Darien Shanske, State Options After Wayfair, MEDIUM (June 22, 2018), 
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/state-options-after-wayfair-3bfe9c87eef5 [http:// 
perma.cc/3RUP-P7S6] (advising states to “offer meaningful vendor reimbursement for compliance 
costs and/or free compliance software”). 
230. See Tony Mauro & Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court’s Internet Sales Tax Ruling is Billion-Dollar Boon 
for States, NAT’L L. J. (June 21, 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/06/21/ 
supreme-courts-internet-sales-tax-ruling-is-billion-dollar-boon-for-states/ [http://perma.cc/T6QM-
WVWX] (“[T]he Quill decision was . . . giving [an] unfair advantage to internet retailers over brick-and-
mortar stores that must pay sales tax.”). 
231. See Brian Galle, Essay, Kill Quill, Keep the Dormant Commerce Clause: History’s Lessons on 
Congressional Control of State Taxation, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 158, 161 (2018) (“Congress is not a 
fully trustworthy custodian of state taxing power.”). 
232. James R. Eads Jr. & David F. Golden, E-Commerce Taxation Issues for Online Businesses, 5 GA. 
B.J. 14, 17 (2000) (stating Congress is in a better position to require the collection of e-commerce 
taxation from vendors). 
29
Mendez Lopez: Wayfair or No Fair
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
766 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:737 
likely.”233  The Supreme Court did not clear up any confusion.234  It has 
also failed to offer a clear alternative.235 
Constructing a new approach requires a deeper analysis of Wayfair. 236  
Many other states have adopted aggressive laws that test constitutional 
restrictions.237  Texas needs to follow this trend because it is too early in 
the legislative process to know whether any of the proposed bills by 
Congress will be enacted or move forward at all.  The Supreme Court is 
headed in the right direction, but it did not answer any questions regarding 
the substantial nexus debate.  Instead, states will continue asking the same 
questions, but instead through the scope of economic nexus.238 
Texas should move forward because this author does not believe Wayfair 
will negatively impact businesses or individuals.  The Supreme Court did not 
impose any new tax on e-commerce.  They are just changing regulations on 
how online retailers collect the sales tax that all other retailers have to 
collect.239  One of the biggest reasons for the shift from brick-and-mortar 
stores to e-commerce is convenience, selection, and sometimes even lower 
costs.240  Additionally, because legislation seems to be headed in the right 
direction to protect smaller businesses, I do not think it should raise 
concern.241  South Dakota has received praise for setting a good example 
 
233. Galle, supra note 231, at 162. 
234. Bryan S. Masterson, Collecting Sales and Use Tax on Electronic Commerce: E-confusion or  
E-collection, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 203, 204–05 (2000) (providing an overview of the Streamlined Sales Tax 
System which was created to clarify the confusion arising from the tax regime at that time); Jeffrey 
Krasney, Wayfair, Quill & The Physical Presence Test: Bright-Line Standard or Diminished Relevance Paradox, 
37 ABA TAX TIMES 17, 20 (2018) (“[C]ongress had chosen not to act.  Congress is well aware that the 
change in landscape has been significant.”). 
235. Matthew C. Boch, Way(un)fair: United States Supreme Court Decision Ends State Tax Physical 
Presence Nexus Test, 53 ARK. L. 18, 2522 (2018) (“Wayfair has overruled Quill but it has not provided a 
clear alternative, instead offering essentially a balancing test of contacts and burdens.”). 
236. See generally Timothy M. Todd, Supreme Court’s Quill and Wayfair Cases Explained, FORBES 
(June 27, 2018, 2:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timtodd/2018/06/27/supreme-courts-
quill-and-wayfair-cases-explained/#649c5fe772a4 [http://perma.cc/82W7-XAA7] (“After Wayfair, 
it’s a new world for online retailers.”). 
237. See Soulsby, supra note 70, at 596–97 (discussing states adopting aggressive laws testing 
constitutional bounds). 
238. See Maddison, supra note 33 (“[I]f [Quill]’s physical presence rule is retired, state courts will 
ask the same questions, but through the lens of ‘economic nexus.’”). 
239. See Bishop-Henchman, supra note 139 (“Internet purchases were not exempt from tax, but 
in many cases it looked that way to consumers.”). 
240. See id. (stating e-commerce sales will not suffer from any new taxes due to other benefits 
which make them still more favorable than brick-and-mortar stores). 
241. See H.R. 6824, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (setting forth the Online Sales Simplicity and 
Small Business Relief Act of 2018). 
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by including compliance software and simplified state rules in its 
provision.242  Legislation has also been proposed to account for compliance 
costs and ease the transition.243  Because states will be reaping the benefit 
of a potentially increased tax revenue, states should be required to pay or 
subsidize the cost of integrating tax collection software.244 
It is “imperative that Congress use its constitutional power over interstate 
commerce to make clear, through legislation, what constitutes a sufficient 
nexus for a state to impose sales-tax.”245  In creating legislation, Congress 
must also consider that there are several benefits to having tax revenue 
collected by someone other than the taxpayer: the tax is more likely to be 
paid because it is not their money, it reduces the number of people tax 
authorities must interact with to collect, and it reduces the risk of 
administrative problems because the taxes are collected by a third party.246 
There are two prominent models that Texas could implement to future 
legislation to mandate sales tax for e-commerce.247  Some states follow a 
notice and report model, which gives remote sellers the choice to “either 
pay a tax on their tangible goods or record customers and inform them that 
they have to pay.”248  This Comment proposes Texas follow a model similar 
to South Dakota, one that generates revenue directly by mandating that 
retailers pay if they meet a revenue or sales quota, because such a model is 
more efficient.249  States should also determine if an origin or destination-
based tax is in its best interest.250  Texas is currently an origin-based tax 
 
242. See Bishop-Henchman et al., supra note 139 (“For instance, South Dakota gives immunity 
from audit to sellers who encounter errors made by sales tax software programs.  It is likely that large 
e-commerce platforms will provide sales tax compliance services for their sellers.”). 
243. See H.R. 6724, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (setting forth the Protecting Businesses from 
Burdensome Compliance Cost Act). 
244. See Bishop-Henchman et al., supra note 139 (“Sellers may need to monitor their new 
compliance requirements and seek a new software solution, but these costs can be minimized if states 
provide the necessary simplifications and protections.”). 
245. Malagna, supra note 224. 
246. Vetter, supra note 1, at 706. 
247. See Taylor N. Armstrong & Caitlin E. Correa, Revenue and Taxation: Sales and Use Taxes, 
35 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 187, 197 (2018) (“[T]here are two prominent models mandating sales tax for 
remote sellers.”). 
248. Id. at 197. 
249. See id. at 197–98 (2018) (“South Dakota’s model generates revenue directly through the 
online retailer by collecting and remitting a sales tax.”). 
250. See Juliana Frenkel, Something’s Gotta Give: Origin-Based E-Commerce Sales Tax, 12 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 133, 133 (2017) (“[I]t is prudent for Congress to finally resolve the circuit split 
and agree on a unifying Online Sales Tax Law.”). 
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state, but it may be time to change if a uniform model is in sight.251  A 
uniform law may be a viable resolution because it would minimize confusion 
and difficulty in administration across the country.252 
The biggest concern in resolving the debate should consider any burdens 
on interstate commerce that may be created.253  Quill is flawed because 
“[t]he Court’s reason cannot have been that the Commerce Clause shields 
remote vendors from paying the same taxes or bearing the same compliance 
obligations as do in-state vendors.”254  The Supreme Court correctly 
overturned the physical presence rule because e-commerce should not be a 
venue to shelter taxes.255  Such a rule holds states back from receiving 
additional tax revenue.256  Even if “individual state residents legally owe use 
taxes,” many are confused about or simply ignore this responsibility.257 
Further, use taxes are not efficient because it is based on an honor 
system.258  It does not work “because individuals purposefully underreport 
their unverifiable use tax obligations for the year, or because they are 
genuinely ignorant to whether they owe the tax and, if so, on what.”259  The 
primary burden in implementing Wayfair placed on taxpayers by states is to 
 
251. See Mark Faggiano, Origin-based and Destination-based Sales Tax Collection 101, TAXJAR 
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://blog.taxjar.com/charging-sales-tax-rates/ [http://perma.cc/7GVU-MFX9] 
(changing Texas’s tax laws may happen if a there is a change to the model code). 
252. See Sally P. Schreiber, Supreme Court overturns Quill’s physical presence requirement, J. ACCT. 
(June 21, 2018), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2018/jun/supreme-court-sales-tax-
decision-201819203.html [http://perma.cc/W6BK-C2LT] (discussing a national standard for online 
sales and use tax collection). 
253. See David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of  
E-Commerce, 92 B.U.L. REV. 483, 486–87 (2012) (arguing that “interstate commerce is only burdened 
when an out-of-state vendor bears reporting or compliance costs as a result of a state’s imposing tax 
collection duties on the out of state vendor”). 
254. Id. at 499. 
255. See Clark Calhoun & Andy Yates, Are New Tax Rules for Out-of-State Retailers  
Unconstitutional, CFO (July 11, 2016), http://ww2.cfo.com/tax/2016/07/new-tax-rules-state-retailers-
unconstitutional/ [http://perma.cc/H2GG-4GYK] (describing the physical presence rule as an 
“unfair constraint” on the ability to collect sales tax). 
256. See Wayfair Ruling Overturns Quill Physical Presence Requirement, GRANT THORNTON  
(June 25, 2018), https://www.grantthornton.com/library/alerts/tax/2018/SALT/General/ 
wayfair-ruling-overturns-quill-physical-presence-requirement.aspx [http://perma.cc/T6QC-53SU] 
(“[P]hysical presence rule is moving further from economic reality and causing the states to experience 
significant sales tax revenue decreases.”). 
257. Gamage & Heckman, supra note 253, at 502. 
258. See Jennifer Weidler Karpchuk, Farewell Physical Presence: Was the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision 
Way off, or Way Fair, 37 ABA TAX TIMES 13, 13 (2018) (describing the use tax system as an honor 
system that simply does not work). 
259. Id. 
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comply with tax law and accessing the tax base.260  If an undue burden 
results from Wayfair, it is because the states were left alone without financial 
help to support compliance and transition costs. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
“State governments and Congress must now focus on providing a 
workable tax framework so that state and local governments, businesses, 
and consumers can thrive in light of the [Supreme] Court’s most recent 
decision.”261  A review of the information shows that Wayfair is moving in 
the right direction for the future of nexus and e-commerce tax laws.  
Historically, this topic has been revisited to keep up with social and 
technological advancements.  Recognition of the burden and role that 
implementation will play on the government, economy, businesses, 
consumers, and practitioners will help to create better policy decisions in 
future legislative decisions.  Consequently, there is still a need for reform as 
states individually and collectively implement Wayfair. 
  
 
260. See generally Hayes R. Holderness, Questioning Quill, 37 VA. TAX REV. 313, 331 (2018) 
(“[T]he basis of the substantial nexus requirement is to prevent undue burdens on taxpayers engaged 
in interstate commerce.”). 
261. Surma, supra note 81, at 523. 
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